TY  - JOUR
AU  - Wolfgang Kromer
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/02/02
TI  - Biological Versus Artificial Consciousness: Will The Two Ever Meet?
JO  - Neurology and Neuroscience
VL  - 7
IS  - 1
AB  - The present opinion article first discusses the fundamental basis of self-consciousness (self-awareness).
The biological situation is then compared to artificial systems. Actually, the deficiencies of artificial
systems will highlight the key features of biological systems.
Biological self-consciousness requires an individual to whom something can become conscious, which
basically depends on the organism’s ability to distinguish between sensory input from its environment
versus its body (embodiment). As any software only provides the tools for processing input, but does not
per se substitute for embodiment, applying the above principle to an artificial system would require its
“body“ (hardware inclusive of the robot’s encasement and its functional parts) being equipped with a
complex sensorium penetrating the whole material. Moreover, input from the latter would have to be
distinguished by the software from any environmental input, and the hardware’s sensorium would have
to be capable to communicate with the software in a bidirectional manner similar to the biological
situation. Also, the artificial system would have to be able to integrate these “bodily“ signals such that
they are “experienced“ as all belonging to one and the same “individual“ entity, as it is the case in a
biological system. It is considered unlikely to meet such highly complex requirements in a dead material.
SN  - 2692-7918
UR  - https://dx.doi.org/10.33425/2692-7918.1119
DO  - 10.33425/2692-7918.1119